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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
GALVESTON SONNY SCOTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 13889 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant, 
Galveston Sonny Scott, appeals from a conviction of the crime 
of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant-
appellant guilty of the crime of manslaughter, a felony of 
the second degree, on October 26, 1974. Subsequently, the 
trial court sentenced appellant to serve an indeterminate term 
in the Utah State Prison of from 1 - 1 5 years, as provided by 
law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction of Galveston 
Sonny Scott should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 1, 1974, a Tuesday, at 1:50 a.m., David 
Allen Gray was shot and killed while in the Beehive Lodge of 
Elks at 248 West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. Three 
other people were also shot, one dying shortly afterwards. 
Appellant, Galveston Sonny Scott, was tried before a jury and 
convicted of manslaughter for the slaying of David Gray. 
The shooting in the early hours of January 1st was the 
final act in a series of altercations between appellant and 
Gray. The first major conflict between the two occured at the 
same Elks Lodge on Saturday, the 29th of December. During 
some other fighting appellant shoved Gray and the two started 
shoving each other. (T-394) Gray then left. Someone told 
appellant that Gray had gone to get a rifle. Appellant sent 
someone to get him a gun but meanwhile borrowed a .45 caliber 
pistol from someone else. (T-395,396). Gray was outside when 
appellant left the Lodge. Gray shot first and appellant re-
turned the fire. Both then left the scene (T-396-399). 
-2-
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There was no further trouble until the night of the 
killing. About 8:00 p.m., on the 31st of December, appellant, 
while driving, saw Gray walking along Second South Street 
in Salt Lake City with a Mr. Blood. Appellant shot at Gray 
three times but missed. Appellant then yelled, "We going to 
settle this tonight." (T-399-402) Three hours later appellant 
went to Gray's home. He did not see Gray but when he saw some 
movement behind a curtain he shot into the house at least 
twice. (T-407) After two more hours appellant proceeded to 
the Elk's Lodge. He left his car in the alley, took his gun 
from the glove compartment, stuck it in his belt, and went into 
the club. (T-410). 
Appellant and a friend, Binky Coleman, entered the club 
at an entrance at the south end of the room. The Elks Club 
is long and narrow inside. At the north end, opposite the 
entrance, is the bar. About 300 people were at the club 
celebrating the new year. The lighting was low and a band 
played. Gray was standing at the far north end of the room, 
by the bar, buying some drinks and talking to Brenda Moore 
who was sitting on a bar stool. (T-46,51) Thelma Cross sat 
a a table right next to Gray (T-93-97) and Estralita Davis 
sat at the bar. (T-241) Appellant proceeded north toward the 
bar area, pushed a man out of his way, took his gun in both 
• - 3 -
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hands and aimed at Gray. (T-418) Brenda Moore testified 
that Gray grabbed her from the barstool and threw her to the 
floor to get her out of the way. (T-47,48) Appellant shot 
and saw Gray go down. He shot at least once more where he 
saw Gray fall. (T-386,387) Thelma Cross, sitting by Gray, 
was hit by a bullet in the side of her head. (T-95,96) 
Estralita Davis, sitting at the bar, was shot through both 
legs (T-218,219) No bullet holes were found anywhere except 
in the bar area behind where Gray had been standing. (T-31,429) 
Gray died within seconds from the effects of a bullet 
which entered his left shoulders, passed through his left 
lung, heart and liver, and exited above his right hip. A 
spent .38 caliber slug was found under his body. (T-61) 
Phillip Dawson was also killed during the shooting. He died 
from the effects of a .22 caliber slug which passed through 
his abdomen. Witnesses testified that Binky Coleman, who 
accompanied appellant, was also doing some shooting, (T-367) 
and that he was using a small pistol. (T-211) Later the 
same day, January 1st, 1974, appellant phoned the widow of 
Phillip Dawson to tell her that he did not kill Phillip. 
Appellant explained that he had only been after Gray and 
Gray's friend Blood, and that he had only shot Gray but that 
he still was going to kill Blood. (T-262). 
-4-
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Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of 
manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County. During the course of the trial a 
motion was made by defense Counsel to permit the jury to view 
the crime scene. The trial court took the matter under ad-
visement. (T-266) After both parties rested counsel for 
the defendant renewed the motion. The court granted the 
motion and called three deputies to conduct the jury to the 
crime scene. (T-432,433) Defense counsel excepted to the 
court's ruling that neither the defendant nor his counsel 
could accompany the jury. (T-434,435) The prosecution was. also 
precluded from viewing the crime scene. 
Also, during the course of his summation, Defense 
Counsel called the jury's attention to the fact that the first 
bullet fired between the appellant and the decedent, David 
Gray, was fired by the decedent with a rifle during the 
Saturday incident. Defense counsel was implying that because 
Gray shot first on Saturday, he was the probable aggressor on 
the night of the fatal shooting. The trial court interrupted 
the Defense Counsel in order to correct and clarify what had 
been said by saying that an aggressor is determined at the 
time that self-defense is claimed and not by prior acts. (T-488) 
Defense Counsel excepted to the Court's remark and now claims 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the trial court erred and prejudiced the defendant's 
right to present his defense to the jury. Appellant now 
appeals from the verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT RULING 
THAT THE JURY COULD VIEW THE CRIME SCENE 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DEPUTIES BUT WITH-
OUT THE PRESENCE OF DEFENDANT OR HIS COUNSEL. 
During the course of the trial a motion was made by 
the defense counsel to permit the jury to view the crime 
scene. The trial court took the matter under advisement• 
(T-266) After both parties rested, counsel for defendant 
renewed the motion. The court granted the motion and imple-
mented the action by calling in three deputies who each swore 
to conduct the jury to the designated place, to preclude any 
person from speaking to the jurors, to preclude the jurors 
from speaking to each other, and to return the jury without 
further delay. (T-432,433) The court also instructed the 
jury that the scene of the crime was not evidence, that they 
were not to ask questions, talk to others, or talk among 
themselves. (T-433) Counsel for the defendant excepted to 
the court's ruling that neither the defendant nor his counsel 
could accompany the jury. (T-434-435) The prosecution was 
also precluded from viewing the crime scene with the jury. 
(T-434,435) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although some statutes and rules of the court limit 
the jury in, or restrict them from viewing the scene of a 
crime, (Abell v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 380, 5 SW 2d 139, 
(1928)) the majority of jurisdictions operate on the assump-
tion that the trial court has the power and discretion to 
grant a view of the scene. (Massenberg v. United States, 
19 P.2d" 62 (4th Cir., 1927)) In those jurisdictions that do 
allow viewing of the scene there is a further conflict of 
opinion on the question of whether the accused has the right 
to be present when the view is taken by the jury. The 
Supreme Court of the United States discussed the question 
extensively in the case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
UVS. 97, 78 L.ed. 674, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1953). The court out-
lined the variations in case law on the subject and described 
the dithering legal philosophies underlying the various 
viewpoints. The Supreme Court pointed out that some state 
courts consider that a view is part of the trial while others 
hold that it is not. The Supreme Court also explained that 
some state courts hold the view to be equivalent to an examina-
tion of a witness, requiring the defendant's attendance, but 
that the better reasoning is that physical objects are not 
witnesses and it is questionable whether the defendant has a 
privilege to attend. Finally, the court pointed out that in 
other states the defendant may be excluded at the discretion 
of the trial judge. (291 U.S. at 118-120) (citations omitted) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court ultimately held that it was not necessary for a 
defendant to be present at a viewing of the crime scene by 
the jury. The court reasoned that: 
"There is nothing he / defendant__/ 
could do if he were there, and almost 
nothing he could gain. The only shred of 
advantage would be to make certain that 
the jury had been brought to the right 
place and had viewed the right scene." 
(291 U.S. at 108) 
The Utah Supreme Court examined the same question in 
State v. Mortensen, 26 U. 312, 73 P. 562 (1903), appeal 
dismissed in 27 U. 16, 74 P.120. In the opinion the court 
quoted the existing statute which authorized a view by the 
jury of a crime scene. Revised Statutes of Utah, Sec. 4870 
(1898). 
"When in the opinion of the court it 
is proper that the jury should view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material 
fact occurred, it may order the jury to be 
conducted in a body, in the custody of an 
officer, to the place, which must be shown 
to them by a person appointed by the court for 
that purpose; and the officer must be sworn 
to suffer no person to speak or communicate 
with the jury, nor do so himself, on any 
subject connected with the trial, and to 
return them into court without unnecessary 
delay, or at a specified time." (73 P. at 571) 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After quoting the statute, the court concluded: 
"It will be observed that, by the 
terms of the statutory provision above 
quoted, the granting of the view is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Neither the presence nor absence of the 
accused is made a requirement«. " (73 P. 
at 571) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court finally held that since the 
view was neither a part of the trial nor the taking of 
evidence, the defendant's attendance was not required. 
(73 P. at 570 and 571). 
The present statute which permits the jury to view 
a crime scene is Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-26, (1953). 
This statute is identical to Revised Statutes of Utah, Sec. 
4870 (1898), quoted supra. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed 
section 77-31-26 in the more recent case, State v. Delaney, 
15 U.2d 338, 393 P.2d 379 (1964), as follows: 
"When a view of the scene is ordered, 
the trial court should appoint somebody to 
conduct the jury thereto, and should simply 
maintain order, but without any further 
participation." 393 P.2d at 380 (emphasis added) 
It is very clear that the trial court in the present 
case handled the matter of the viewing of the crime scene 
properly. All of the provisions of the Utah Code and the 
pertinent case law were followed explicitly. 
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There are three rights which appellant has claimed 
were violated by not allowing him to accompany the 
jury; (1) the right to monitor the viewing; (2) the 
right to be present when evidence is taken; (3) the 
right to be present at all "critical" stages. None of 
these claimed rights are valid under the facts of 
this case. There was no need for the defendant or 
his counsel to monitor the view. Thre deputies and 
the ballif adequately took care of supervising the 
thirteen jurors. Each deputy was sworn to monitor, 
the jurors in the appropriate manner. Mo evidence 
was taken or allowed to be taken. 
Finally, the view by the jury was not a "critical11 
stage of the prosecution. The United States Supreme 
Court has said that a defendant has the right to have 
counsel for his defense at "critical" stages of the • 
prosecution. United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967). 'Critical" 
stages are defined as any time counselfs presence is 
necessary to assure a meaningful defense. (388 U.S. at 
225). If the defense counsel is present he can preserve 
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial by being 
better prepared to cross-examine the witnesses and to 
lend greater assistance during trial. (388 U.S at 225-
227). Custodial interrogation of the accused is recog-
nized as a critical stage (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964))
 f as is 
out-of-court identification of the accused. United 
States v. Wade, supra. Counsel can make sure that a 
confession is not coerced or that a line-up is not 
conducted in a prejudical manner. However, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that many stages are not "critical.11 
requiring the presence of counsel. Taking a handwriting 
sample is not a "critical" stage because there are very 
few ways in which the sample can be taken. The accused 
can always- confront the statefs findings at trial 
through ordinary cross-examination and the use of 
expert witnesses. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 
263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967). Likewise, 
scientific analysis of the accused1s fingerprints, 
blood, clothing, hair, and the like are not critical 
stages. United States v. Wade, supra. The Court noted 
that there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel 
at such analysis would derogate the accused's rights to 
a fair trial. (388 U.S. at 228). 
Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court,' it 
is evident that a view by the jury is not a "critical" 
stage. There are very few ways' to view a room, counsel 
was not going to cross-examine the jury, and no evidence 
was taken. There is no right of the accused which counsel 
could have better protected by being present at the viewing. 
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Even if the trial court did err in allowing the 
jury to view the crime scene in the absence of the 
defendant, the conviction should be affirmed. Appellant 
moved the court to proceed in a certain manner and 
therefore cannot assign error to such procedure. 
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions, 
limits the rights of appellants in what can and cannot 
be appealable errors. Such situations come into 
existence where defendant pled error to some facet of 
a trial where they induced the court into error or 
acquiesced to the decision made. This "after-the-fact" 
argument is exactly what appellant is doing on this 
^appeal. Simply stated, he is attempting to better his 
chances by claiming error to the ruling of the court 
which he asked the court to make. This "afterthought" 
approach claims "prejudice" when in fact no such 
prejudice existed. 
A leading case of the United States Supreme Court 
in this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 18, 
63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed.704 (1943), held that the prac-
tice of claiming error on appeal from self-induced 
requests at trial cannot be sustained. The Court said: 
- 12 -
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"We cannot permit an accused to 
elect to pursue one course at the 
trial and then, when that has 
proved to be unprofitable, to 
insist on appeal that the course 
which he rejected at the trial 
be reopened to him. However un-
wise the first choice may have 
been, the range of waiver is wide. 
Since the protection which could 
.have been obtained was plainly waived, 
••'.. the accused cannot now be heard to charge 
the court with depriving him of a fair 
trial." 
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil, 
the Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the 
position referred to above. In State v. Aikers, 87 
Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935), the Court said; 
"We think the rule applicable that a 
party cannot successfully assign as error 
a ruling which he himself induced the court 
to make." 
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the 
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107 
(19 72), where the defendant's counsel chose to examine a 
witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed 
on appeal that it was prejudical error for the judge to 
have granted such motion. The court made it clear that 
the error complained of was self-induced and that it 
would not be permitted to stand on appeal. The court 
said: 
"Counsel chose not to do so, whether 
as a matter of strategy or otherwise--and 
it does not lie in the mouth of defendant 
now to claim error having either wittingly 
or unwittingly invited it." 
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See also, State v. Phippen, 280 Kan. 962, 494 P.2d 1137 
(1972); State v. Gilreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385, 
(1971), cert, den. 406 U.S. 921, 32 L.Ed.2d 121, 92 S.Ct. 
1781; Stilley v. People, 160 Colo. 329, 417 P.2d 494 
(1966) . 
In the instant case, since the trial court allowed 
the jury a view of the scene at the insistence of the 
defense counsel, such action cannot be assigned as error 
on appeal by the defense counsel. If defense counsel 
did not want the jury to view the scene in the absence 
of the defendant, he could have recalled his motion. 
Applying the rationale of the above-cited statutes 
and authorities to the instant case, it is clear that the 
decision of the trial court in not allowing the defendant 
or his counsel to accompany the jury was completely within 
the proper bounds of discretion and constituted no 
reversible error. The conviction of appellant should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
AFTER A MISLEADING REMARK MADE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL 
DURING SUMMATION, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY POINTED OUT 
THAT AN AGGRESSOR IS DETERMINED AT THE TIME THAT SELF-
DEFENSE IS CLAIMED AND NOT BY EVENTS THAT OCCURRED TWO-
DAYS BEFORE THE FATAL ENCOUNTER AND PRIOR TO A MUTUAL 
WITHDRAWAL. 
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During the course of his summation defense counsel 
called the juryfs attention to the fact that the first 
bullet fired between the appellant and the decedent, 
David Gray, was fired by the decedent with a rifle 
during the Saturday incident. Defense counsel was 
implying that because Gray shot first on Saturday, he 
was the aggressor on the night of the fatal shooting. 
As is demonstrated infra, defense counsel's remarks were 
misleading to the jury. The trial court interrupted 
in order to correct and clarify what had been said. The 
trial court correctly pointed out that an aggressor is 
determined at the time that self-defense is claimed 
and not by prior acts, although prior acts may have an 
influence on what occurs. Defense counsel excepted 
to the correction and now claims error. Appellant claims 
that the judge's remarks confused and misled the jury 
as to whether the defendant, in self-defense, could 
pursue and seek out his assailants. Appellant also 
claims that the remark prejudiced his right to present 
his defense to the jury. Respondent submits that the 
trial judge gave the correct version of the law and 
properly interrupted defense counsel to avoid his mis-
leading the jury. 
The trial court may and should regulate the 
argument of counsel, and it is proper for the court, 
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of its own motion, to interpose when counsel is trans-
gressing the rules or misstating the law. In Commonwealth 
v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 174 N.E. 665 (1931), 
the court said: 
"The presiding judge should be the 
1
 directing spirit and dominating force 
of a trial to the end that a just result 
is reached.1 [Cite omitted.] To 
accomplish this result he may in his 
discretion stop them when they occur 
. . . ." [Cites omitted.] 174 N.E. at 668. 
An accused has the right to have his counsel argue the 
law insofar as the law is not misstated, State v. Gilbert, 
65 Idaho 210, 142 P.2d 584 (1943). But the trial court 
has the duty to make certain that members of the jury 
are not led astray by improper statements of attorneys. 
People v. Estrella, 116 CA2d 713, 254 P.2d 182 (1953). 
This responsibility to regulate the arguments of 
counsel is part of the discretion that is given a trial 
judge. It is particularly important for the trial 
court to be attentive to counsel's closing arguments to 
make certain that the jury is properly informed as to 
the law. Therefore, control of the closing argument 
is left to the trial courtf which is granted broad dis-
cretion to control the conduct of the trial Lee v. People, 
170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969); State v. Goodin, 
8 Or. App. 15, 492 P._2d 287 (1971). Appellate courts will 
only interfere when gross abuse of discretion is made to 
appear. Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 371 P.2d 786 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1962), cert, den. 371 U.S. U.S. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 112, 
83 S.Ct. 144. 
In the instant case defense counsel gave an 
incorrect interpretation of the law of self-defense to 
the jury. The trial court, in the proper discretion 
and exercise of its authority, interrupted defense 
counsel in order to clarify the law. It was the trial 
court's duty to furnish the jury with correct informa-
tion. 
Even if there was any abuse of discretion, there 
was not that gross abuse that is necessary before 
an appellate court should interfere. The Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 
297, 301, 302 (1969), wrote with regard to alleged error: 
11
. . .the alleged error must be evaluated 
in conformity with the provisions of Section 
77-42-1, U.C.A 1953; an appellate court must 
give judgment without regard to errors or 
defects which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. This court may not 
interfere with a jury verdict, unless upon 
review of the entire record, there emerges 
errors of sufficient gravity to indicate 
that defendants1 rights were prejudiced 
in some substantial manner, i.e., the error 
must be such that it is reasonably probable 
that there would have been a result more 
favorable to the appellant in the absence 
of error." 
State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970); See 
State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970); 
State v. Neal, 1 Utah 756, 262 P.2d 756 (1953). 
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The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle in State 
v, Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, (1974), where 
the court stated in a criminal trial for robbery: 
"that there should be no reversal 
of a conviction merely because of error 
or irregularity, but only if it is 
substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that in the absence there is 
a reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a different result." 
30 Utah 2d at 370, 371. 
The law of self-defense is universally recognized. When 
one is under the necessity of killing another in order 
to save himself from death or great bodily harm, he may 
kill the other without fear of punishment. Allen v. 
United States, 150 U.S. 551, 37 L.Ed 1179, 14 S.Ct. 
196 (1893). However, among other restrictions on the 
use of self-defense, the slayer must establish that he 
was not the aggressor and that he did not provoke the 
fatal conflict. DeVaugh v. State, 232 Md.447, 194 A.2d 
109 (1963), cert, den. 376 U.S'. 927, 11 L.Ed.2d 623, 84 
S.Ct. 693. 
The pertinent Utah self-defense statute is Utah Code 
Ann. §§76-2-401, 402 (1973). 
"Section 76-2-401. Conduct which is 
justified is a defense to prosecution for 
any offense based on the conduct. The 
defense of justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in 
defense of persons or property under the 
circumstances described in Sections 76-2 
402, through 76-2-406 of this part; 
* * * 
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Section 76-2-402. (1) A person is 
justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to defend himself or 
a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, 
a person us justified in using force 
which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he 
reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
" (2) A person is not justified in 
using force under the circumstances 
specified in paragraph (1) of this 
section if he: 
"(a) Initially provokes the use of 
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm 
upon the assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, commit-
ting, or fleeing after the commission of a 
felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged 
in a combat by agreement, unless he with-
draws from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his 
intent to do so and the other notwith-
standing continues or threatens to con-
tinue the use of unlawful force." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is obvious that self defense is not available to 
one who is the aggressor. The aggressor is the one 
who performs the acts which produce the specific 
occasion and bring on the difficulty. Wallace v. 
United States, 162 U.S. 466, 40 L.Ed.2d 1039, 16 S 
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859 (1895). Therefore, even if the deceased struck 
the first blow, or fired the first shot, the accused 
may not rely on self-defense if he was the agressor, 
Adams v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 285, 33 S.W. 354 (1895). 
As the transcript is reviewed, it is evident that 
the defense counsel gave incorrect and misleading 
information to the jury concerning the term "aggressor." 
[MR. HANSEN:] Let me tell you, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, what the court has defined 
the aggressor as. fAn aggressor is the 
one who first1 --and underline that word 
and put it in quotes and circle -- first 
fis the one who first does acts of such 
a nature as would ordinarily lead to a 
deadly combat or as would put the other 
person involved in fear of death or 
serious bodily injury.f 
It's undisputed, there isnft one 
witness that disputes that the first 
shooting involved in this couple of 
days1 spree was with a rifle by Gray 
and Blood at Sonny Scott in the alley 
Saturday night, and with their way of 
life — ( T. 488)" 
It was then the duty of the trial court informa-
tion on the law. The trial court said: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Hansen, I am 
going to have to interrupt you. 
MR. HANSEN: That's fine. 
THE COURT: The agressor is determined 
at the time that the self defense is claimed, 
not by prior acts, although prior acts may 
have an influence on what occurred at the 
time. You may proceed. I'm sorry to 
interrupt you. 
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MR. HANSEN: May I note my exception 
to that? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. HANSEN: Thank you. (T. 488-489)" 
The jury was, in fact, confused by the remarks of the 
defense counsel. After several hours of deliberation 
they asked the following question: 
"FOREMAN: How far can a man go in 
pursuing someone under the law, under 
the guise of self defense. That is, 
basically, is a man justified under 
the rules of self defense to go after 
the man or — (T. 540)." 
This demonstrates that the jury was confused into thinking 
that appellant had the right to go after Gray on Tuesday 
morning simply because Gray had assaulted him on Saturday. 
There is no authority, including that offered 
in appellant's brief, for the statement that one may, 
in the name of self-defense, seek out his original 
assailant for the purpose of killing him. Appellant 
offers nine cases but a cursory examination reveals 
that none of them speak to the professed point. 
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 133, 45 S.E. 
2d 908 (1948), the defendant was beaten up by X, defendant 
went home and got a weapon and stayed hone. X came to 
defendant's house and made a move as if to draw a gun. 
Defendant shot X. But defendant did not go looking for 
X after X originally withdrew. 
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In State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 300, 92 S.W. 663 
(1906), defendant came to town looking for a fight. 
He finally started to pick on X. Defendant mistakenly 
understood that X had threatened him. Defendant shot 
X six times while X was unarmed. Defendant was convicted 
because he sought out and killed the man who he thought 
threatened him. 
State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 
(1963), says you can go where you have a right to be, 
but says nothing about seeking out the adversary to 
kill him. The other cases cited by appellant are 
similarly distinguishable on the same basis. 
Alternately, appellant claims that self defense 
is available to an individual if he acts affirmatively 
in response to acts or threats of another even though 
the other's acts or threats are removed in time and 
circumstances from the fatal encounter, so long as there 
is a close connection. While this statement may be 
true in the abstract, it has no application to the 
instant case. The authority offered in support 
is used entirely out of context and has no bearing to 
the case at hand except to prove that the conviction 
should be affirmed. Recalling the facts, it should 
be remembered that Gray shot at appellant on Saturday. 
Appellant returned the fire. Both withdrew. Two days 
later, on Monday night, at 8:00 p.m., appellant, seeing 
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Gray on the street, fired three shots. Then at 11:00 
a.m., appellant, thinking Gray was at home, fired into 
Gray's house. Finally, realizing Gray was at the Elks 
Club, appellant sought him there and killed him. 
Defendants counsel intended to show that because 
Gray fired first on Saturday, appellant had the right, 
in self defense, to act on that assault by killing Gray 
on Tuesday morning. Defendant's counsel proposes that 
these are all the same circumstances and that the 
relation of time is close enough to show appellant that 
action. Appellant cites State v. Lee, 85 S.C. 101, 67 
S.E. 141 (1910), and 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 45 as 
authority. However, if the opinion in the Lee case 
is examined and if the entire paragraph is read in 
context in Am. Jur. , it is evident that the appellant's 
conviction must be affirmed. Both authorities stand for the 
proposition that a jury can look at the accused1s 
activities (faults) shortly before the fatal encounter 
to determine if he was in fact the aggressor (at fault). 
They say nothing concerning the faults of the decedent or of 
the right of the other to kill a faulting decedent. If 
the two authorities are to be used, they demonstrate 
that since appellant made three attempts on Gray's life 
in one night, finally succeeding, and since the times 
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of the three attempts were so closely connected, 
appellant was the aggressor and his conviction should 
be affirmed• 
Finally, it should be pointed out that defense 
counsel himself said the very thing that he excepted 
to having the judge say. Defense counsel, in effect, 
admitted that the judge was correct in interrupting 
him. The trial court had said: 
"The aggressor is determined at the 
time that the self defense is claimed, 
not by prior acts (T.488)." 
Later, defense counsel, while attempting to 
play down all the shooting by appellant on the night 
of the homicide, said: 
"Prior difficulties have nothing 
to do with it. It's what happens at 
the time of the event. (T.492)." 
If "prior difficulties" two hours removed from the 
fatal shooting should not be considered in determining 
if appellant was the aggressor, then certainly "prior 
difficulties" two days removed should not be considered 
as proof that the decedent was the aggressor. 
Applying the above rules, reasoning and 
authority to the facts of the case, it is clear that 
the defense of self defense is not available to the 
appellant. It is also evident that the trial court 
was performing a proper duty in correcting the mis-
leading statements of defense counsel before the jury. 
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There was no error and the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no error in the trial court ruling 
that the jury could view the crime scene under the 
supervision of deputies but without the presence of 
defendant or his counsel. Further, the trial court 
had a duty to correctly point out to the jury that 
an aggressor is determined at the time that self 
defense is claimed and not by events that occurred 
two days before the fatal encounter and prior to a 
mutual withdrawal. This court should affirm the verdict 
and judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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